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ABSTRACT
Since the early 1990s the Australian Commonwealth public sector has undergone
significant financial reforms, due primarily to the current federal Liberal government’s
drive to improve the financial accountability of the Commonwealth Government. These
reforms include the adoption of accrual accounting and budgeting and the development and
implementation of an outcomes and outputs framework. These reforms culminated in the
first full federal budget to be developed on an accrual basis in 1999 – 2000. This paper will
examine the implementation of these reforms and the associated processes to determine
whether or not the Commonwealth government is more financially transparent and better
able to discharge its financial accountability. It is argued the complexity of the processes
associated with, and the reporting requirements of these reforms may have actually
decreased the level of accountability to the key party to whom accountability is due — the
Australian public.
Key words: financial reform, financial accountability, accrual accounting, outcomes and outputs
framework
†

The author would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. All errors
contained in this paper are solely the responsibility of the author.

INTRODUCTION
The Australian Commonwealth public service has undergone significant financial and nonfinancial reforms over the past two decades in an effort to improve its efficiency, effectiveness
and accountability (Guthrie 1998, p. 2; Barton 2005, p. 138), its transparency (Barrett 1994, p. 2),
as well as its productivity and competitiveness (Boxall 1998, p. 18). The two main objectives of
the financial reforms identified by the previous Secretary of the Commonwealth Department of
Finance and Administration (DOFA), Dr Boxall, is the encouragement of a culture of
performance and making the public sector more responsive to the needs of government (1998, p.
18). These objectives are reflected in DOFA’s statement that the financial reforms were
implemented to place greater focus on “measuring what is being produced, what is being
achieved and what is the full cost of individual goods and services, and on the reporting of
performance” (1999, p. 2). The most noted financial reforms have been the adoption of accrual
accounting and budgeting and the development and implementation of an outcomes and output
framework
These reforms resulted in the first full federal budget to be developed on an accrual basis
in 1999–2000. The outcomes and outputs framework, by which government appropriations are
specifically directed to government organisations, was developed in parallel with the first full
whole of government accrual budget. It is important to note that along with the adoption of
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accrual accounting and budgeting and the implementation of an outcomes and outputs framework
the federal government also introduced specific legislation to support its reform agenda. This
legislation included the Financial Management and Accountability (FMA) Act 1997 and the
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies (CAC) Act 1997, which provide for the use of
Commonwealth resources, as well the reporting and accountability rules for Commonwealth
organisations, the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998, which provides a framework for the
conduct of Government fiscal policy, and the Auditor-General Act 1997 which provides a broad
reaching mandate for the Auditor-General and the Australian National Audit Office (Barrett
2004, p. 7).
The Senate, also known as the House of Review is one of the main mechanisms used by the
government and parliament to discharge their financial accountabilities. The Australian
Constitution, section 81, outlines that “all revenues or moneys raised or received by the
Executive Government of the Commonwealth shall form one Consolidated Revenue Fund, to be
appropriated for the purposes of the Commonwealth”. The Senate, through various legislative
committees, scrutinises the planned government organisations’ estimates of required funds
[budget estimates], contained in specific appropriation bills, which are created as per section 83
of the Australian Constitution “no money shall be drawn from the Treasury [Consolidated
Revenue Fund] of the Commonwealth except under appropriation made by law”. These annual
appropriation bills, secure money for the implementation and delivery of services of the
government and the parliament for the financial year (Evans, 2004). Appropriation Bills No. 1
and 3 provide funding for the "ordinary annual services" of Government (DOFA 2006a) and
while Appropriation Bills No. 2 and 4 provide funding for capital injections as well as
administered funding for government outcomes. The government organisation is expected to use
the funds obtained from its accrual appropriation(s) “to manage all its finances, including capital
replacement and working capital requirements” (National Commission of Audit (NCOA),
Chapter 9).
To assist senators, who participate in the legislative committees, as well as other members
of parliament to understand the various appropriation bills, each government portfolio produces a
portfolio budget statement (PBS). These PBSs are designed to “inform Senators, Members and
the public of the proposed allocation of resources to Government outcomes. The PBS provides an
important means by which the Executive Government remains accountable to the Parliament”
(DOFA, 2006a) as well provide an agenda for the senate legislative hearings.
The primary purpose of this paper is to explore the adoption of accrual accounting and
budgeting and the implementation of the outcomes and outputs framework in the Australian
Commonwealth public sector and examine whether these financial reforms have the meet the
current federal Liberal government’s objectives in fostering greater financial transparency, and in
turn, better government financial accountability — both to parliament and to the Australian
public. The methodology, the way in which research is conducted (Dillard 1991, p. 12), for this
paper is based on a subjectivist position which can be referred to as ideographic research (Dillard
1991, p. 12; Gaffikin 2006, p. 8). This type of research relies on qualitative methods including
archival research and hermeneutics which were the key methods used in collecting and analysing
the data for this paper.
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Financial Reform
The Commonwealth public sector has experienced over the last decade some significant reforms,
particularly in relation to financial management and taxation. The reasons behind the financial
reforms are subject to conjecture; however, several commentators identify the “new
managerialism” in the public sector (Jackson and Lapsley, 2003, p. 360) and the perceived need
of the public sector to improve productivity and competitiveness in response to increased
globalisation (Boxall, 1998) as primary reasons. For example, Dr Boxall (1998), the then
Secretary of the Department of Finance and Administration, identified the introduction of
accrual-based budgeting, the increased use of market-based and financial management tools and
the preparation of accrual-based whole-of-government financial statements as some of the key
reasons of public sector financial reform.
The significant public sector financial reforms did not occur in an ad hoc manner; rather,
they were specifically developed with two objectives. The first, which complements Jackson and
Lapsley’s (2003) notion of “new managerialism”, is to promote a culture of performance (Hoque
and Moll, 2001; Boxall, 1998). The second identified objective was to increase public sector
organisations’ accountability, efficiency and effectiveness, to make them more responsive to the
needs of government (Hoque and Moll, 2001; Boxall, 1998). This new culture of performance
was also in response to meeting the increased accountability expectations of government and the
Australian electorate.
The next section discusses one of the key financial reforms, in the Commonwealth public
sector, the adoption of accrual budgeting and accounting.
Accrual Accounting
The private sector has been using accrual accounting over the past 200 years, and one of the
reasons for it continued use is that it has been able to meet the changing information needs of
businesses (Barton, 1999, p. 31). Accrual accounting involves the recognition of revenues and
expenses when they are incurred, rather than when cash is received or paid. Fellew and Kelaher
(1991) explain that accrual accounting is based on the concept of matching costs to income. In its
1996 report, the National Commission of Audit (NCOA) stated that accrual budgets would match
the flows of economic benefits over particular periods to the flows of economic costs. In doing so
they would incorporate information on expenses accruing and revenues arising from current
policies (NCOA, Chapter 9).
Before accrual accounting was implemented in the Commonwealth public sector,
accounting and budgeting was based on a cash basis. This involves recording actual and budgeted
cash inflows and outflows (Hoque and Moll, 2001, p. 319), that is, revenues and expenses are
recognised when cash is received or paid. This is consistent with the previous method of funding
government organisations, where they received cash to fund programs and activities. However,
under accrual budgeting, government organisations receive operating and capital funds to
produce specified outputs and outcomes (Boxall, 1998). The Management Advisory Board
(MAB) explains that one of the main aims of the Commonwealth public sector in adopting
accrual accounting was met by allocating costs and benefits to the reporting period to which they
relate, as well as defining the resources controlled by an organisation at the end of that period
(1997). The NCAO suggested that
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… accrual accounting would eliminate the distortions in the cash based budget deficit or surplus caused by
asset sales and repayments of advances. … it [accrual budgeting] would also include asset depreciation and
accruing employee costs such as superannuation in the measure. This would make the resulting budget
result (deficit/surplus) more transparent than the existing (unadjusted) cash based result (Chapter 9)

Another benefit of accrual accounting is that government and its organisations can minimise
costs, because accrual accounting provides a cost base with which to cost products and service
delivery accurately (Webster, 1998; Hoque and Moll, 2001). DOFA also identifies this benefit,
explaining that “accrual budgeting substantially expands the range of information available for
the effective management of public finances” (DOFA, 1999, p. 8).
Accrual accounting can be seen promoting better financial accountability as it allows
users of reported financial information to make reliable financial and performance comparisons
between reporting periods and between public and private sector organisations. The MAB (1997)
suggests that accrual information can be used to develop standard ratio analyses, whereby simple,
understandable measures can be monitored and compared within the organisation and with other
organisations: “ratios allow a simple snapshot of key financial performance measures” (MAB,
1997, p. 63).
While the implementation of accrual accounting has brought several benefits, it has also
created concern and confusion for some, including public servants working in both finance and
non-finance roles. The change has had a significant operational impact, and accordingly, the
mindset of the government organisation officer has had to change significantly. Public sector
managers were now required to focus on outputs and outcomes, rather than on inputs. They had
to, and continue to, ask themselves what accrual accounting means, why they must measure,
record and seek funding for non-cash items such as depreciation, and how this might improve the
delivery of services to the Australian public. This situation is exacerbated by many public
servants who still operate on a “cash mentality”, whereby they focus on the funds they have to
use in a period of time rather than on using the funds for a specific output. This confusion is
further compounded by the policy that requires unused appropriations be returned to consolidated
revenue at the end of the financial year, and before the government organisation can access to
these unused funds, they need to apply formally to DOFA.
Outcomes and Outputs
As discussed above the move to accrual accounting was part of a package of financial reforms the
Commonwealth undertook to accommodate the desired paradigm shift to a greater focus on
measuring what is and is to be achieved, determining the full cost of goods and services, and on
performance reporting (DOFA, 1999, p. 2). The other key reform, introduced in parallel with
accrual accounting, was the development and implementation of an outcomes and outputs
framework. While the previous accounting method, cash accounting, focused on inputs and the
control of expenditure (Hoque and Moll, 2001), accrual accounting focuses on outcomes and
outputs.
The Management Advisory Board (MAB) explains that an outcome is the impact desired
from the implementation of government policy. For example, Outcome 1 of the Department of
Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs Portfolio (FaCSIA) is “Greater selfreliance and economic, social and community engagement for Indigenous Australians” (2007a).
The government assigns funds to government organisations based on specific outcome statements
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as the “outcome statements perform a specific legal function by describing the purposes of
appropriated funds” (MAB, 1997, p. 15). Thus outcome statements serve two specific purposes:
they define the impacts government expects, and “articulate the purpose of the relevant
appropriations under the Appropriation Acts of the Commonwealth Budget” (DOFA, 2000, p.
10). However the outcomes are quite ambiguous and are very difficult to measure. This presents
a paradox in that the government implemented an outcomes and outputs framework for greater
focus on “measuring what is being produced, what is being achieved and what is the full cost of
individual goods and services, and on the reporting of performance” (DOFA 1999, p. 2) yet how
do you accurately measure greater self reliance and economic, social and community engagement
for Indigenous Australians? The answer is partly addressed through the identification of specific
outputs which are defined as the “tangible presence of the agency amongst its clients, customers
and stakeholders” (DOFA 2000, p. 19). For example, an output linked to the FaCSIA outcome of
“greater self reliance ... for Indigenous Australians” is Administration of Native Title and Land
Rights (FaSCIA, 2007b). The performance of FaCSIA in relation to this output is measured by
both qualitative and quantitative performance measures. The qualitative performance measure is
“Effective support to Indigenous land claimants and title holders” and quantitative measure is
“Professional native title services delivered in native title representative areas and effective
management of Commonwealth land rights legislation” (FaSCIA, 2007b). Unlike outcomes,
outputs are not part of the legislative requirements for appropriation bills; however, they are often
the key focus of committee members during the estimates hearings.
Based on accrual budgeting and the outcomes and outputs framework government
organisations prepare budget estimates which are used to determine the amount government
funds the organisation requires to achieve the government determined outcomes. The next section
will discuss the basic process of how the government funds are provided to government
organisations..
Appropriation Bills
DOFA (2006b) explains that Appropriation bills are the bills that “appropriate money from the
Consolidated Revenue Fund to provide funds for government and parliamentary expenditure”.
The creation of these bills is inline with the requirements outlined under section 83 of the
Australian Constitution which states that funds can only be drawn from the Consolidated
Revenue Fund under an appropriation made by law (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution
Act). Appropriation bills are introduced into the House of Representatives by the Treasurer (on
budget night in May each year), and are then tabled in the Senate. Two of the key functions of the
Senate are to review legislative (including appropriation bills) and other proposals initiated in the
House of Representatives and “to provide adequate scrutiny of financial measures, especially by
committees considering estimates” (Evans, 2004). The committees that review the appropriations
are called Senate legislation committees.
The following diagram outlines the basic flow from government organisations developing
internal strategic plans to achieve the government agreed outcomes to the receipt of funds to
implement the tasks and activities on the strategic plans.
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The next section will provide a brief outline of the structure and role, in relation to
reviewing various government agencies budget estimates, of the Senate legislation committees.
Senate Legislation Committees
Twice each year the Senate refers the estimates of the proposed annual expenditure of
government departments and authorities, contained in the appropriation bills, to one of its
legislation committees for their examination and reporting. These committees consist of six
senators — three from the government (one of whom is the committee chair), two from the
opposition and one representing the minority parties or independents (Senate Brief 5). However it
is also quite normal for other senators to attend the hearing and indeed participate in the hearing.
Yet their participation during the hearings is limited, for example they cannot participate in
specific functions of the committee such as voting on points of order raised during the hearing.
Harry Evans (2004), then Clerk of the Senate, describes how the legislation committees’ scrutiny
of the estimates in appropriation bills allows the Senate to assess the performance of the public
service and its administration of government policy and programs. One of the interesting points
of these estimates hearings is that one of the rules of the committee, standing order 26, explains
the committee must take all evidence in public. Indeed not only is it possible for members of the
public to sit-in on the committee hearings, it is also possible to watch the proceeding live on the
Parliament of Australia’s website and obtain complete transcripts, Hansard, of the meeting via the
same website. This level of access to the committees can be seen as a component of discharging
the accountabilities of the government and parliament through an apparent high level of
transparency.
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Evans also explains that another key feature of the committee is that senators can directly
question officers of the public service about a government organisation’s proposed expenditure
and the effectiveness and efficiency of various programs. However, public servants are not meant
to comment on government policy. Indeed, at the beginning of each committee hearing the chair
states: “The Senate has resolved that an officer of a department of the Commonwealth or of a
state shall not be asked to give opinions on matters of policy” (Finance and Public Administration
Legislation Committee, 2006). For example, they should not answer a question about whether an
immigration detention policy is the correct measure to address problems identified with illegal
immigrants. This directive by the chair does not preclude the senators asking (or baiting) officers;
so, to assist the committee, the relevant government minister (or their representative) is present
during the committee hearings. This often leads to the tone of the hearing moving from an
enquiry into the proposed expenditure of public funds to a political brawl between senators from
opposing sides of politics. This is particularly evident when a committee member, or
participating senator, is the alternative Minister (ie opposition member) and uses the opportunity
to directly challenge the current Minister on matters of policy. These discussions can detract from
the objective of and dominate the legislation committee.
Another important process occurs when a public servant is unable to supply an immediate
answer to a question asked by a member of the committee or is unsure of the correct answer. As
outlined in Senate Brief 5 Consideration of Estimates by the Senate’s Legislation Committees the
question is then taken ‘on notice’, which gives the government organisation a specific period to
obtain and provide a written answer to the committee. The following is an extract from the 2006
estimates hearing of the Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts
Legislation Committee Estimates.
Senator (Non-government)—I have a few questions. There is a reference in the environmental budget
overview statement at paragraph 6. The minister’s foreword states:
Our international focus is also reflected in the Government’s environment aid budget, which now
reaches $316 million … Can the officers provide me with a breakdown of that $316 million.
Senior Public Servant —We would have to take that detail on notice. We receive those figures from
AusAID.
Senator (Non-government)—I am surprised, given it is in the minister’s statement, that you are not
aware of how it is going to be spent.
Senior Public Servant —We certainly have the information. I am just checking through my papers as
to whether I have actually brought it with me. But it will certainly be in the department.
Senator (Non-government)—I would hope so.
Senior Public Servant —It is not in the papers that I have brought with me, but we can certainly take it
on notice. We have the information in the department.

A problem with questions taken on notice is that the information is provided back to the senator
via the committee is not included in the readily available Hansard transcripts. There appears to
be a tendency to take more difficult questions on notice which in turn reduces the level of
transparency of the committee hearing. Indeed some senators will provide government
organisations with lists of questions on notice without the questions even being asked during the
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committee. This level of silence reduces the transparency of the process and reduces the
effectiveness of the committee.
The function of the senate legislation committee whilst improving the level of
transparency and inturn being a tool for discharging government and parliament accountability is
not seen as the best process but rather as the current process. For example ALP Senator Kim Carr
an experienced government and opposition senator made the following comment about the
effectiveness of estimates committees:
I have over the years spent much time in Senate Estimates hearings, which I enjoy greatly. But I don’t
believe that basic facts about the way the Commonwealth dollar is being spent, should have to be winkled
out via this process (Carr, 2003, p. 10).

Senate Brief 10 states that “This process [senate estimates hearings] provides a vehicle for those
committees to examine the performance of departments”. It also allows senators — especially
non-government senators — to gather information on the operations of government (Senate Brief
5). To assist the committee members have several sources from which to draw information to
scrutinise the estimates and to formulate questions for the government organisation’s officers.
These include portfolio budget statements (PBS), portfolio additional estimates statements
(PAES), annual reports of agencies, the reports of the auditor-general, corporate plans and other
budget statements (Evans, 2004; Senate Brief 5). While this level of information appears it would
be very useful for reviewing a government organisation’s budget estimates it worth considering
the background, education and employment, of the senators on these committees. Do the
senators, particularly the committee members, have sufficient knowledge and experience to know
what they are actually trying to examine? While the process may be a useful tool in assisting the
parliament discharging the accountability of the government are the actors involved in the
process know what they are reviewing? This concern is particularly significant at this point in
time given that as at the 30th June 2007 of the 52 senators who currently sit on these committees
only three have formal accounting qualifications and these three are all government senators.
The following section discusses the primary source of information for senators during the
legislation committees, the portfolio budget statements (PBS), which contains the budget
estimates of each government organisation for each government policy measure.
Portfolio Budget Statements (PBS)
Each portfolio department is required to prepare a portfolio budget statement, in conjunction with
the Departments of Finance and Administration, Treasury and Prime Minister and Cabinet, which
should explain the government-agreed outcomes of government organisations and the proposed
allocation of appropriations. The DOFA guidelines for the PBS outline that the purpose of the
PBS is to explain appropriation bills (numbers 1 and 2) to senators and members.
Stephen Bartos, former Deputy Secretary of the DOFA, told the Finance and Public
Administration Legislation Committee in 1999 that the PBS:
…is one of the central budget documents that enables effective public scrutiny of Commonwealth
expenditures. As such, it needs to be in a format that is tailored to the information needs of senators and
members to ensure that it is able to be used as a document that can enhance accountability and ensure
disclosure (17 June 1999, p. 2).
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Some senators and members (especially those not qualified or experienced in interpreting
financial reports), find the PBS a confusing document particularly as it only provides
information on the estimates of the current year’s performance, the next financial year’s budget
(the focus of the document) and forward estimates for the next three years. Another problem
found by users of the PBS is that it only provides information by outputs and outcomes rather
than by division of a portfolio. The following extract from the 2007 estimates hearing of the
Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts Legislation Committee
Estimates is an example where the PBS is seen as a tool that does not provide sufficient
information for examining and reviewing a government organisation’s budget estimates and
actually hinders transparency.
Senator (Non-government) —Why is it then that the Office of the Supervising Scientist [OSS] is
expected to present an annual report to parliament and its annual reporting requirements are not part of
the department of environment’s requirements? If they are special enough to provide a discrete annual
report, why do they not even get one mention in your PBS?
Senior public servant—They do get a mention in our annual report, but it is just like I mentioned
before: the PBS does not look at the issues division by division. The treatment of the Office of the
Supervising Scientist is no different than any other area. You will see the list by outputs and outcomes
and not on a divisional basis. That is the way the Commonwealth reports in the portfolio budget
statement.
Senator (Non-government)—This is about the third year in a row. What I am getting at is there is no
transparency as to exactly what you are allocating in the financial year to the OSS.
Senior public servant —I am sure Mr XXXX will answer questions about his financial position, but
the PBS is prepared completely in accordance with advice that we get in terms of its preparation. If you
flip through it, you will not find mention on a division-by-division basis other than their contribution to
the outcomes and outputs. I know that does not help you, but—
Senator (Non-government)—I will just make the point that the OSS is significant and important
enough to table its own discrete annual report to the parliament but does not even get one mention in
your PBS.

“In approving the budget estimates for the coming year, senators realistically want to be
reassured that the past year’s spending was proper and actually achieved something. They do not
have that reassurance in the current PBS” (DOFA, 2000, p. 26). The tabling of annual reports
(albeit usually some months after the estimates hearings) provides this historical data to allow
senators and members to make comparisons between the funds appropriated and the funds spent.
In the above example, the senator would be able a access the relevant information in the Office of
the Supervising Scientist’s annual report, however the annual report is not due to be tabled in
parliament until October, some five months after the legislation committee has met to review and
report on the budget appropriations. So it is reasonable assume senators would use the previous
financial year’s annual report to assist in examining the current year’s budget estimates. The use
of these dated reports again raises the issue on whether transparency can be adequately met and
whether financial accountability is appropriately discharged.
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Financial Accountability
Funnell and Cooper summarise accountability as the obligation to answer for decisions made and
actions conducted on authority which has been transferred from another (1998, p. 30). The
senate legislation committee is a key feature in the government’s and parliament’s desire to
properly discharge their financial accountabilities to the Australia electorate. The senate
legislation committee provides a channel for government organisations, through senior public
servants and their respective Ministers, to be held to account for the decisions they have made in
relation to the use of the funds appropriated. A key criterion for the discharge of financial
accountability is transparency. Cameron (2004) succinctly describes transparency as the essence
of accountability. In the public sector, legislation committees examining estimates have no
power to take evidence in secret; that is, they are public hearings. This is one way that
transparency is achieved in the public sector. In addition, all documents that are received
officially as evidence by the committees become public documents accessible to all, as are the
transcripts of the proceedings. This level of transparency is generally supported by members of
these committees. For example Senator Kim Carr (ALP Senator) explained there is a need to
“maintain full public accountability and to ensure that it is not diminished by notions of
‘commercial confidentiality’” (2003, p. 8). However, this comment raises the issue of an
interesting paradox. The public sector through the adoption of various private sector practices and
procedures such as accrual accounting could be considered to have a need to protect information
that would in the private sector be considered commercial-in-confidence. Indeed some times
Ministers and public servants try to justify non compliance to a request for information during a
senate estimates hearings as being due to commercial in confidence. For example the following is
an extract from the 2006 estimates hearing of the Environment, Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts Legislation Committee Estimates:
Senior Public Servant—I am not actually allowed to provide daily running cost for the Aurora
Australis under our charter, but the general range of costs—
Senator (Non-government)—That is under the charter with P&O, is it?
Senior Public Servant —Yes. The general range of costs—
Senator (Non-government)—Why is that?
Senior Public Servant —It is a commercial-in-confidence arrangement.
Senator (Non-government)—Why?
Senior Public Servant —It has been that way for many years.
Senator (Non-government)—Yes, but why is it? It is public money that is being expended there, isn’t
it?
Senior Public Servant —It is commercial in confidence.
Senator (Non-government)—Why is it commercial in confidence? It is a straight arrangement with a
shipping company.
Government Minister—We put it up for tender on a regular basis, so there is commercial stress on
them. They would want to keep that—but you know what the total running costs of the program are, so
it is in terms of parliamentary accountability.
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Senator (Non-government)—Extraordinary.

However at the beginning of each estimates hearing the Chair of the committee reads out
the prescribed directions for the hearing which includes:
The Senate, by resolution in 1999, endorsed the following test of relevance of questions at estimates hearings.
It reads: Any questions going to the operations or financial positions of the departments and agencies which
are seeking funds in the estimates are relevant questions for the purpose of estimates hearings.
I remind officers that the Senate has resolved that there are no areas in connection with the expenditure of
public funds where any person has discretion to withhold details or explanations from the parliament or its
committees, unless the parliament has expressly provided otherwise.

Unfortunately the Chair of the committee is also a member of the government so like the
example provided above questions outside the scope of the committee often go through relatively
unchecked unless a non-government senator pursues the matter.
Accountability is a complex notion and it is not one which can be adequately addressed
through one definition, however it is generally accepted, as found in Funnell and Cooper’s
summary, that accountability implies a relationship of authority, based on the idea that those who
are accountable are in some sense subordinate to those to whom they must give account (Mulgan,
1997, p. 27). However, it is questionable whether parliament and government are subordinate to
the Australian electorate, especially because parliament developed and approved the
implementation of the current accountability processes — “in the public sector, the public
accountability process is largely determined by legislation and the parliamentary system”
(Cameron, 2004, p. 59). Pat Barrett (2003), a former auditor-general, explained that
accountability in the public sector implies conformity with a system of administrative processes
designed to designate authority for administrative actions, and simultaneously provide a
framework for reporting and checking on actions taken.
The concerns relating to the public accountability process being determined largely by
those who are accountable is increased by the conflicting interests of the committee members.
Loney (2004) outlines how government members of the committees are firstly members of a
political party, and are expected to be loyal to their party, and secondly members of legislative
committees. Similarly, the committee members are also in a position to use the committee to
promote themselves and their party. This could explain some behaviour that does not directly
contribute to discharging accountability, for example, aggressive questioning of government
policy during an estimates hearing.
Despite these concerns, the level of documented and reported performance information is
fundamental to improve public sector accountability (Cameron, 2004), and this view is shared by
several actors in the public sector. For example, Senator Kim Carr (2003) explained that the
reporting obligations of government organisations are fundamental parts of public service
accountability. The Department of Finance and Administration also significantly focuses on
ensuring that government organisations properly and fully meet their reporting obligations. The
Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) similarly contributes to the discharging of public
sector financial accountability through its auditing of government organisations and by tabling
their reports in parliament (Barrett, 2003). This responsibility of the ANAO is outlined under
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section 57 of the Financial Management and Accountability Act 1997 and section 35 of the
Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997,
The senate legislation committee is a key feature in the government’s and parliament’s
desire to ensure their financial accountabilities are, or at least seen to be, discharged. The
following diagram provides a simplified example of the processes.
Diagram 2
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The question remains have the recent financial reforms improved financial accountability and
have the other objectives of these recent reforms been met?
CONCLUSION
The recent financial reforms, accrual accounting and the outcomes and outputs framework,
instigated several operational and contextual changes for the public sector. Their reporting
obligations have since increased significantly, as has the scope of their reports. For example,
under the cash accounting system, there is no facility to identify, measure and report on expenses
such as depreciation which leads to distorted budget deficits or surpluses. However, under accrual
accounting, depreciation expenses are included as is accumulated depreciation, a contra asset,
which impacts on the book value of the relevant asset and therefore needs to be considered in the
development of government organisations’ budget appropriations.
These financial reforms may seem superficially to have improved financial accountability
within the Commonwealth public sector. The objectives of the financial reforms, including to
promote a culture of performance (Hoque and Moll, 2001; Boxall, 1998) and increase public
sector organisations’ accountability, efficiency and effectiveness (Hoque and Moll, 2001; Boxall,
1998) are unlikely to have resulted in anything other than better accountability. However, the
complexity of the new processes, reporting requirements and various “discharging” mechanisms
may have actually decreased the level of accountability. The PBS does not provide any
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information on the past performance of a government organisation and the information that is
contained in the PBS is based specifically on outcomes and outputs, which are generally very
ambiguous. The government does require the government organisations to prepare and table an
annual report which would provide more useful, and clearer, information however the timing of
when this report is tabled in parliament, October, means the value of the document to the main
estimates process is significantly diminished. It can also be argued the new processes don’t
provide adequate transparency, which is the essence of accountability (Cameron, 2004). This lack
of transparency can be explained due to the number of questions during the estimates hearing
being taken ‘on-notice’ and the ambiguous nature of the objectives of government organisations,
outcomes.
Limitations of this study and future research
The main limitation of this research is the level of review undertaken on the various components
of the financial, reporting and accountability processes. There is a wealth of data to collect on
each component and it is possible that significant studies could be undertaken on these
components individually. For example it would be worthwhile studying whether the PBS is more
informative than the previous information sources available to senators during the estimates
committee process. This could be undertaken by reviewing the Hansard transcripts from previous
estimates hearings as well as developing questionnaires for senators and other members of
parliament who have experienced the pre and post periods of the recent financial reforms.
Another area of future research could be a study on specific government departments’ behaviours
towards implementing and working with the financial reforms. It would also be possible to
conduct some empirical research on whether accrual accounting has led to more or less under or
overspends, in comparison to budget estimates tabled in parliament. As the lack of specific
literature indicates there are significant researching opportunities in this area.
REFERENCES

Barrett, P.J., Australian Auditor-General, 2003, “Government sector accountability — the impact
of service charters in the Australian public sector”, Queensland Commonwealth Regional
Heads Forum, 15th Annual Government Business Conference, May.
Barton, A., 1999, “Public and Private Sector Accounting — The non-identical twins”, Australian
Accounting Review, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 22–31.
Barton, A., 2005, Professional Accounting Standards and the Public Sector – a Mismatch,
Abacus, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 138 – 158
Boxall. P., 1998, “The revolution in government accounting”, Australian CPA, Vol. 68, No. 3,
pp. 18 – 20.
Cameron, W., 2004, “Public accountability: Effectiveness, equity, ethics”, Australian Journal of
Public Administration, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 59–67.
Carr, K. 2003, “Achieving the Right Balance between Responsiveness, Transparency and
Accountability in Policy Advice and Implementation, Australian Journal of Public
Administration, Vol. 63, No. 3, pp. 3–11.
Commonwealth of Australia, 2006, Official Committee Hansard, Senate, Environment,
Communications, Information Technology and The Arts Legislation Committee Estimates,
Budget Estimates Thursday, 25 May 2006
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, Chapter 4 Finance and Trade, at
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/general/constitution/chapter4.htm (accessed 14 July 2007)
46

The Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, August, 2007
Bowrey : Recent Financial Reforms Public Sector.
Vol. 1, No. 3.
Department of Family, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaCSIA) (2007a) Portfolio
Overview
at
http://www.facsia.gov.au/internet/facsinternet.nsf/VIA/budget200708/$File/2007-2008_FaCSIA_PBS_03_overview.pdf (accessed 14 July 2007)
Department of Family, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (FaCSIA) (2007b) Agency
Budget Statements at http://www.facsia.gov.au/internet/facsinternet.nsf/VIA/budget200708/$File/2007-2008_FaCSIA_PBS_04_facsia.pdf (accessed 14 July 2007)
Department of Finance and Administration (DOFA), 2006, Appropriation Bills, at
http://www.finance.gov.au/budgetgroup/appropriation_bills.html (accessed 16 February
2007)
Department of Finance and Administration (DOFA), 1999, Review of Budget Estimates
Production Arrangements, July 1999.
Department of Finance and Administration (DOFA), 2000, The Outcomes & Outputs
Framework: Guidance Document, November 2000.
Department of Finance and Administration (DOFA), 2002, Estimates Memorandum — 2002–13.
Department
of
Finance
and
Administration
(DOFA),
2006a
at
http://www.finance.gov.au/budgetgroup/Other_Guidance_Notes/portfolio_budget_statemen
ts__p.html (accessed 14 July 2007)
Department
of
Finance
and
Administration
(DOFA),
2006b
at
http://www.finance.gov.au/budgetgroup/appropriation_bills.html (accessed 14 July 2007)
Dillard, J.F. 1991, Accounting as a Critical Social Science, Accounting, auditing and
Accountability Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 8 – 28
Evans, H., 2004, Odgers’ Australian Senate Practice, 11th edition, Canberra, Department of the
Senate, 2004, at: http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/pubs/odgers/index.htm (accessed 16 June
2006).
Fellew, K. and Kelaher, M., 1991, Managing Government the Corporate Way, Australian
Accountant, Vol. 61, No. 3. pp. 20-22.
Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee, (17 June 1999).
Finance and Public Administration Legislation Committee, (24 May 2006).
Funnell, W.N. and Cooper. K., 1998, Public Sector Accounting and Accountability in Australia,
University of New South Wales Press Ltd, Sydney
Gaffikin, M. 2006 The Critique of Accounting Theory, University of Wollongong, School of
Accounting and Finance Working Paper Series 06/25
Guthrie, J., 1998 Application of accrual accounting in the Australian Public Sector – Rhetoric or
Reality?, Financial Accountability and Management, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 1 – 19
Hoque, Z. and Moll. J., 2001, “Public Sector Reform: Implications for accounting, accountability
and performance of state-owned entities — an Australian perspective”, The International
Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 14, No. 4, pp. 304–326.
Jackson, A. and Lapsley, I., 2003, “The diffusion of accounting practices in the new ‘managerial’
public sector, International Journal of Operations and Production Management, Vol. 16,
No. 5, pp. 359–372.
Loney P., 2004, “Beware the Gap! Parliamentary Oversight or Parliament Overlooked?” A paper
for the Association of Public Accounts Committees Conference, Nelspruit, South Africa,
October 2004.
Management Advisory Board (MAB), 1997, Beyond bean counting: Effective Financial
Management in the APS — 1998 and Beyond, December 1997.
Mulgan, R., 1997, “The Process of Public Accountability”, Australian Journal of Public
Administration, Vol. 56, No.1, pp. 25-36.
47

The Australasian Accounting Business & Finance Journal, August, 2007
Bowrey : Recent Financial Reforms Public Sector.
Vol. 1, No. 3.
National Commission of Audit (NCOA), Report to the Commonwealth Government, AGPS,
Canberra, June 1996 at http://www.finance.gov.au/pubs/ncoa/chap9.htm (accessed 14 July
2007)
Senate
Brief
No.
10,
The
Role
of
the
Senate,
February
2005,
at:
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/pubs/briefs/brief10.htm (accessed 16 June 2007).
Senate Brief No. 5, Consideration of Estimates by the Senate’s Legislation Committees, February
2005, at: http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/pubs/briefs/brief05.htm (accessed 16 June 2007).
Webster, A., 1998, “Improving performance: Accrual accounting points the way ahead”,
Australian CPA, Vol. 68, No. 3, pp. 24–26.

48

